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Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel*
Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze under EU Law
A. Introduction
Article 82 of the EC Treaty provides for a condemnation of excessive prices.
However, the general concept of ‘excessive price’ may cover two very differ-
ent realities. An excessive price may be an exploitative abuse, i.e., a direct
exploitation of market power. In this case, the dominant firm charges a high
price to its customers (either end-users or undertakings with which the dom-
inant firm does not compete). Alternatively, an excessive price may be an
exclusionary abuse, aiming to strengthen or maintain the market power of the
dominant firm by putting rivals at disadvantage. In this case, the dominant
firm in one market, e.g., a market upstream, sets the price of the input so high
that the margin between wholesale and retail prices is insufficient for an
efficient firm to profitably operate in the downstream market. These two
types of excessive prices are based on different legal and economic principles
and hence are analysed separately in this paper.
This paper aims to study the current case law of both types of excessive
prices, and furthermore aims, on the basis of economic theories and legal rea-
soning, to propose policy recommendations for antitrust authorities and the
courts. This review is timely for several reasons.
First, although the number of excessive pricing cases in the EU has so far
been relatively modest (albeit not insignificant), the incidence of such cases
may increase in the future due the combined effects of the liberalisation of
network industries and the decentralisation of European antitrust enforce-
ment. Indeed, liberalisation opens to antitrust intervention sectors of the
economy where prices used to be regulated (albeit with another legal instru-
ment) and where dominant positions are prevalent and not easily contestable.
As we show, liberalised sectors are among the best candidates for antitrust
price control intervention, in the absence of effective regulation. In addition,
the decentralisation of competition law1 increases the role of national 
* Economics Department of the European University Institute, Florence and Universitat
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona; Law Department of the European University Institute, Florence.
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paper states the law as of 1 December 2003 unless indicated otherwise.
1 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on com-
petition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1 [2003].
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competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts in applying Article 81(3)
EC, but more generally in the application of all antitrust provisions, includ-
ing Article 82 EC.2 This may in turn increase the number of excessive price
actions for two reasons: first, the NCAs are probably more prone to political
capture than the Commission and national politicians may desire to see an
end put to excessive prices to please their voters; and second, the enhanced
role of national courts can increase private actions, and unfair price cases are
good candidates for unhappy customers. 
Second, the Commission is undertaking a review of its policy on abuse of
dominance, and wishes to rely on economic theory to evaluate and refine
established practice and develop new enforcement policies where necessary
(Lowe, 2003: 5).
Third, at a time when antitrust systems are converging across the world, the
treatment of exploitative excessive pricing remains one important difference
between the EU and the US. Across the Atlantic, the case law3 and doctrine
have consistently held that a competition authority may not condemn
exploitative excessive prices. As observed by Areeda and Hovenkamp (1996:
paragraph 720b), ‘the Courts correctly regard as uncongenial and foreign to
the Sherman Act the burden of continuously supervising economic 
performance, particularly the firm’s day-to-day pricing decisions’. The US
approach has been further explained by Fox (1986: 985 and 993), who notes
that ‘US law is not regulatory (in the sense of direct regulation of price and
output) but rather concentrates on preserving conditions whereby free mar-
ket forces constrain price and induce optimal production’ and thus ‘rests on
the principle that price should be controlled by [the] free market unless
Congress has in effect determined that the market cannot work and has estab-
lished a regulatory commission’. The extent of control of the US authorities
is thus limited to exclusionary excessive prices.
The paper is organised as follows: after this introduction, Section B deals
with exploitative prices and Section C deals with the application of exclu-
sionary prices, in particular the practice known as ‘price squeeze’. Each sec-
tion distinguishes the principles derived from the case law and from
Commission practice while proposing certain policy recommendations.
Finally, Section D briefly concludes. The paper is limited to the European
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2 In other words, the impact of the long-established direct effect of Article 82 EC (see Case
127/73 BRT/Sabam [1974] ECR 51) will be enhanced.
3 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co, 273 U.S. 392 (1927): “(. . .) in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we
should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct
in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reason-
able—a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our eco-
nomic organisation and a choice between rival philosophies”; United States v. Aluminium Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). For a tentative explanation of the divergence between EU
and US, see Fox (1986); Hawk (1988); and Kauper (1990: 655).
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level, and does not cover national practices.4 Moreover, the paper concen-
trates on cases of single dominance, and does not address cases of excessive
prices charged by collectively dominant undertakings.
B. Exploitative Prices
1. Principles derived from the case law
1.1 Dominant position
Article 82(a) EC prohibits a dominant firm from ‘directly or indirectly impos-
ing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’. A
firm holds a dominant position if it possesses enough market power to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of the competitors, customers and
ultimately consumers.5 Due to the general formulation of Article 82, every
dominant firm, however its market power has been acquired or maintained
(Kauper, 1990: 660), has a ‘special responsibility’6 not to set excessive prices.
The Court of Justice confirmed this principle explicitly for the first time in
Parke Davis, and has constantly maintained it ever since.7
1.2 Abuse: When is a Price Excessive?
A price is excessive when it is above the competitive level
Joliet (1970: 243) considered that a price is unfair when a dominant firm has
actually taken advantage of its dominant position to set prices significantly
higher than those which would result from effective competition. Hence, a
price is excessive when it is significantly above the effective competitive level.8
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4 For an overview of national practices, see Böge (2003) and Ruppelt (2003, written contribu-
tion for this volume) for Germany; Green (2003, written contribution for this volume) for United
Kingdom; Conseil de la Concurrence français (2003) for France; and Hordijck (2002) for the
Netherlands.
5 Case 27/76 United Brands [1978] ECR 207, para. 65.
6 The reference here is to the general formulation adopted by the Court in Case 322/81
Michelin [1983] ECR 3461.
7 Case 24/67 Parke Davis [1968] ECR 55. More recently, see Case C-323/93 Centre d’insémi-
nation de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paras. 25–6; Case C-242/95 GT-Link [1997] ECR 
I-4449, para. 39.
8 This more precise formulation of unfair prices is adopted by the German competition law
(§19, Sec. 4, No.2 GWB). From this wording, a price is proved to be excessive by means of the
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This reasoning was followed by the Court of Justice in United Brands,9
where the Court held that: 
249. It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has
made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way to
reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been normal and
sufficiently effective competition.
250. In this case charging a price which is excessive because it has no reasonable
relation to the economic value of the product would be an abuse.
Thus, a price is unfair when it is above the economic value of the product,
which means above the normal competitive level. In the Guidelines on verti-
cal restraints, the Commission defines a ‘competitive’ price as being equal to
minimum average costs.10 Indeed, a price below average costs would not be
viable (and could not be taken as the competitive benchmark), in case of fixed
costs. Also, when competition is for the market rather than in the market (in
particular, where the market is dynamic and characterised by high investment
and network effects), price may have to be set substantially above the average
total cost of the winning firm. 
As for the means of proof, the Court was very open as to the methodology
to prove an excessive price in United Brands: 
251. This excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were possible for it
to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of the product in
question and its costs of production, which would disclose the amount of the profit
margin (. . .).
253. Other ways may be devised—and economic theorists have not failed to think
up several—of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a product is
unfair (emphasis supplied). 
And indeed over time, the Court developed a veritable cocktail of approaches
to determine whether a price is excessive, as summarised in Table 1 below (see
similarly, although not identically, Lowe 2003: 11). Indeed, an excessive price
may be proved by comparing the price under review with different indicators:
cost measures of the dominant firm; other prices applied by the dominant
firm; or prices of other firms offering products similar to the one of the inves-
tigated firm.
94 1 – Policy Objectives, Enforcement Tools and Actors etc.
so-called ‘as-if competition’ test, whereby a price is unfair if it is significantly above the price pre-
vailing in a comparable but competitive market plus a certain mark-up. Nevertheless, due to the
difficulty of finding such a comparable market, the German courts have allowed a second means
of proof by comparing the price in question with (efficient) production costs.
9 Cited at note 5.
10 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 291 [2000], para. 126.
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C. Comparison with Efficient Costs of Production and
Profitability Analysis
In United Brands, UBC charged different prices for its ‘Chiquita’ branded
bananas to ripeners/distributors from different Member States and prohib-
ited the distributors from reselling its bananas, thereby partitioning the com-
mon market. Among other abusive practices impeding the single market
(resale prohibition, refusal to deal, discrimination), the Commission11 con-
sidered that the prices on several continental markets (Germany, Benelux and
Denmark) were excessive for three reasons: they were (1) at least 100% higher
than the price practised on the Irish market which UBC allegedly admitted
not to be loss-making; (2) 20% to 40% higher than the prices of unbranded
bananas in the continental countries, even though their quality was only
slightly lower; (3) and 7% higher than the price charged by competitors of
branded bananas, which were sold profitably. The Commission imposed a
fine on UBC of €1 million and suggested that a decrease in price of 15%
should remedy the abuse. 
Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze Under EU Law 95
11 Commission Decision of 17 December 1975, Chiquita, OJ L 95 [1976].
Table 1: Proof of exploitative excessive pricing
Cost of the Other prices of Price of other firms
dominant firm the dominant firm offering similar
(Discrimination) products
Same relevant United Brands 1978 (Competitor 
market (product CICCE 1985 comparison)
and geographic) SACEM II 1988 United Brands 1978
Ahmed Saeed 1989 Parke, Davis 1968
Renault 1988
Other relevant General Motors General Motors 1975
market in the same 1975 Bodson 1988
Member State British Leyland 
1986
Other relevant United Brands 1978 (Benchmarking)
market in another Sirena 1971
Member State Deutsche
Grammophon 1971
SACEM I 1989
SACEM II 1989
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On appeal, the Court of Justice held that:
252. The questions therefore to be determined are whether the difference between
the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the
answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been imposed
which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products. (. . .)
256. The Commission was at least under the duty to require UBC to produce par-
ticulars of all the constituent elements of its production costs.
Based on these principles, the Court annulled the Commission Decision on
the point of unfair pricing for insufficient proof. First, the Commission did
not try to calculate the production costs of the bananas, despite the fact that
such a calculation was feasible, as revealed by a 1975 study of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.12 The Commission did even
not request UBC to produce its cost data. Second, the use of the Irish price as
a benchmark was open to criticism because it was not clear whether this price
was profitable. Third, a 7% difference with the main competitors could not
automatically be regarded as excessive.
Closely following the wording of the Court, Faull and Nikpay (1999: 192)
argue that a twofold test was imposed by the Court’s judgment in United
Brands. According to these authors, the first component of the test is a
cost/price analysis, while the second component is an analysis to determine
whether the price is excessive, either in itself or by comparison with competi-
tors’ products. However, we suggest that both components of the test aim to
prove the same thing, i.e., that the price in question is significantly above the
competitive level, and that the two components should not necessarily be
used cumulatively. We also suggest that the Court in United Brands estab-
lished a priority rule with respect to the different means of proof in favour of
a direct cost calculation. Indeed, an antitrust authority should try to get cost
data and to compare such data with the alleged excessive price. It is only when
it is too difficult to get these data, or in order to complement a cost analysis,
that the authority may decide to compare competitors’ prices, and more gen-
erally to compare the investigated prices with benchmarked prices.
In subsequent cases, the Court refined the price/cost comparison. In
CICCE,13 the Court rejected a complaint against the Commission that had
refused to condemn unfairly low prices paid by French television companies
(operating at that time as a monopsonist) for broadcasting films. In its analy-
sis, the Commission refused to compare an average production cost for all the
films with an average selling price, and instead considered that the analysis
should be done for each film separately due to the considerable variance of
costs and fees between the films. In its decision, the Court endorsed this
96 1 – Policy Objectives, Enforcement Tools and Actors etc.
12 See para. 254: “[Working out] the production costs of the bananas [does] not seem to pre-
sent any insuperable problems”.
13 Case 298/83 CICCE [1985] ECR 1105, paras. 24–5.
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approach. Thus, in case of similar products having different cost structures,
an approach based on the use of averages should be ruled out.
In SACEM II,14 the Court considered that the production costs to be taken
into account are those of an efficient firm, and not necessarily those of the
investigated firm which may have inflated production costs because of its
dominant position (X-inefficiency). Indeed, the Court stated that a firm may
not justify its unfair price with high production costs because the possibility
may not be ruled out that it is precisely the lack of competition on the market
in question that accounts for the high costs. 
Finally, in Ahmed Saeed,15 the Court addressed the difficulty of apportion-
ing the common costs among several services. In an obiter dictum to a 
preliminary ruling case on airline tariffs, the Court held that:
43. Certain interpretative criteria for assessing whether the rate employed is exces-
sive may be inferred from [sector-specific regulation], which lays down the criteria
to be followed by the aeronautical authorities for approving tariffs. It appears in
particular that tariffs must be reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated
costs of the air carrier, while taking into account the needs of consumers, the need
for a satisfactory return on capital, the competitive market situation, including
fares of the other air carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent dump-
ing.
Therefore, if sector-specific regulation provides accounting rules for the
national regulatory authority (NRA) to control prices, the very same rule may
be followed by the competition agency to determine if price is excessive.16
To conclude, a first approach to the assessment of whether prices are exces-
sive consists of computing costs of production and establishing whether the
price set by the dominant firm is above a ‘reasonable’ price. Figure 1 illus-
trates this method: the price pn is deemed excessive if it is above the price p*.
Of course, there are at least two problems with this approach. The first is that
the method is to a large extent arbitrary, and we will not dwell upon it: what
is the margin of profits that the courts should be ready to accept17; or in other
Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze Under EU Law 97
14 Cases 110, 241 & 242/88 Lucazeau/SACEM (SACEM II) [1989] ECR 2811, para. 29.
Similarly, see Case 395/87 Tournier (SACEM I) [1989] ECR 2521, para. 42. The Court’s
approach as described in this paragraph is shared by a majority of commentators (see, among
others, Kauper, 1990: 662; Whish, 2003: 692), but not by Hordijk (2002: 471). According to
Hordijk, it is only in exceptional circumstances that supposedly inflated production costs should
be disregarded. 
15 Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803.
16 For instance, the Commission recommended the use of a Long Run Incremental Cost
(LRIC) methodology for the pricing of fixed interconnection and the unbundled access to the
local loop in the telecommunications sector. LRIC consists of evaluating the network elements
at the current or prospective value of an efficient operator and allocating them in accordance
with the principle of cost causation. See Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on inter-
connection in a liberalized telecommunications market (Part 1—Interconnection pricing), OJ L 73
[1998]; and Commission Recommendation of 25 May 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop,
OJ L 156 [2000] at Article 1(6).
17 See, for instance, the profitability analysis referred to by OXERA (2003).
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words, what is the maximum ‘fair’ price p* above which the price charged by
a dominant firm is excessive? The second concerns the difficulty of computing
the level of costs, c.
Comparison with other Prices Charged by the Dominant Firm
A direct calculation of costs, which is already difficult for a sectoral regulator
even when firms are subject to an accounting transparency obligation, may be
virtually impossible for an antitrust authority. The authority may thus decide
to compare more easily observable data, such as two different prices charged
by the same investigated firm. The authority may show that the same price is
charged for two services having different costs, as illustrated by Figure 2.
Alternatively, the authority may show that two different but profitable prices
are charged for the same product, and that the price charged to some cus-
tomer is therefore excessive, as a profitable lower price has been charged to
others. This situation is illustrated by Figure 3.
In these cases, the authority shows that both prices are profitable and dis-
criminatory in order to prove that one of them is excessive. This price will be
condemned under Article 82(a) EC (unfair price). In addition, the very same
prices may also be condemned under Article 82(c) EC (discrimination), and,
98 1 – Policy Objectives, Enforcement Tools and Actors etc.
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in practice, most excessive pricing has tended to be subsumed into price dis-
crimination cases.
To do so, the authority may decide to compare two prices that the domi-
nant firm charges in the same Member State. This approach was applied by
the Commission in General Motors,18 its first ever unfair pricing decision. In
the beginning of the Seventies, General Motors Continental had been granted 
the legal monopoly to issue conformity certificates for vehicles used in
Belgium. Thus, the cars sold in one Member State but re-imported into
Belgium had to obtain this certificate. At first, GMC was charging €146 for
this service, but soon afterwards the company decreased its price to €25 for
the European models.
The Commission considered that the initial price was unfair, and imposed
a fine of €100,000, for four reasons. (1) The price of approving American
models imported in Belgium was the same as the price of approving European
models, whereas the cost of the former was higher than the latter because
more European models were imported, hence the fixed costs were spread
among a greater quantity. (2) GMC itself was ready to offer the service at €25
for some clients who were unwilling to pay the full charge. (3) Other Belgian
firms acting as authorised agents of other manufacturers carrying out inspec-
tions similar to those provided by GMC charged only €70 or less. (4) The
price charged by the government testing stations before the legal monopoly
was granted to GMC was only €30.
On appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed in principle that an unfair price
would be abusive,19 but did not address the means of proof as it was not dis-
puted that GMC’s price was excessive. However, the Court annulled the
Commission decision because the issuance of conformity certificate was a new
responsibility for GMC transferred from state testing stations, and for which
it applied a high rate for an initial period but soon thereafter brought its rates
into line with the real economic cost of the operation. 
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18 Commission Decision of 19 December 1974, General Motors, OJ L 29 [1975].
19 Case 26-75 General Motors [1975] ECR 1367, para. 12: “Such an abuse (of a dominant posi-
tion) might lie, inter alia, in the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic
value of the service provided and which has the effect of curbing parallel imports by neutralising
the possibly more favourable level of prices applying in other sales areas in the Community 
(. . .)”.
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A very similar case arose ten years later. British Leyland also enjoyed a legal
monopoly to issue national certificates of conformity. Initially, BL charged
£25 for both right-hand drive and left-hand drive cars, then increased the fee
for left-hand drive cars to £150 for dealers and £100 for private individuals.
Following the opening of a Commission procedure, BL charged a uniform fee
of £100, and then reduced it back to £25. The Commission20 considered that
these prices could not reflect the cost of the service and were probably aimed
at curbing parallel imports. Accordingly, it imposed a fine of €350,000.
On appeal,21 the Court upheld the Commission Decision by considering
that the only difference in relation to the issue of a certificate for right-hand
drive and left-hand drive vehicles was a simple administrative check that
could not entail significant costs. Thus the difference in cost between both ser-
vices could not justify the difference in fees. In fact, the fees did not relate to
the costs and were fixed solely to make the re-importation of left-hand drive
cars less attractive.
Alternatively, an antitrust authority may decide to compare the prices
charged by the dominant undertaking in two different Member States. As seen
above, this approach was followed by the Commission and implicitly endorsed
by the Court in United Brands, which clarified the relationship between unfair
and discriminatory prices. To prove unfair pricing, the Commission has to
show that the prices are different (without justification) for the same product,
and that both prices are profitable. To prove that prices are discriminatory, the
Commission has to show that the prices are different (without justification)
and that they place buyers at a competitive disadvantage.22
Comparison with Prices of other Firms Offering Products Similar to Those of
the Dominant Firm
The authority may also compare the price under review with the prices of sim-
ilar products offered by another firm. This method has several variants,
depending on the position of the other firm: such other firm may be active on
the very same relevant market as the dominant firm (ie, it may be a competi-
tor); it may be active on another geographic market but may still operate in
the same Member State as the dominant firm; or it may be active in another
Member State.
This first variant (comparison with competitor prices) is illustrated in
Figure 4, where pM is the price of the dominant firm and pC is the price of the
other firm. 
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20 Commission Decision of 2 July 1984, British Leyland, OJ L 207 [1984].
21 Case 226/84 British Leyland [1986] ECR 3263, para. 28. This is the only European Court
case condemning an exploitative excessive price.
22 In United Brands, the Court considered that the Commission had sufficiently proved that
the prices in question were discriminatory. However, the Court considered that the Commission
had not sufficiently proved that the prices were excessive, as it was not clear that the lower Irish
prices (used as a benchmark) were profitable.
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This approach was followed by the Commission in United Brands, where it
compared the price of Chiquita bananas with the prices of branded bananas
of similar quality. The Court implicitly endorsed the approach but held that
a 7% difference is not enough to automatically be regarded as excessive.23
However, this is a particularly misleading test, since it risks the finding of
excessive pricing whenever there are differences in quality between the prod-
ucts of different firms. If the dominant firm has attained its leadership
through superior products, then it will also be able to command higher prices,
without this being abusive.
A particular application of this method consists of comparing the price of
a patented product offered by the investigated firm with the price of a similar
unpatented product offered by competitors. 
In Parke Davis,24 the Court of Justice was asked by a Dutch tribunal
whether the patented holder might charge higher prices than that of a similar
unpatented product coming from another Member State.25 The Court replied
that the comparison between the prices of a patented product in one Member
State and the price of a similar unpatented product in another Member State
was not sufficient to prove excessive pricing. But it was not clear at the time
of the case whether this insufficiency was due to the fact that two compared
prices were between patented and unpatented products, or to the fact that the
compared prices were between two different countries. This ambiguity was
clarified three years later in Deutsche Grammophon (see below), where the
Court held that the comparison of prices between two countries might be
indicative of an abuse. Thus, the judgment in Parke, Davis was explained by
Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze Under EU Law 101
23 United Brands, para. 266.
24 Cited at note 7.
25 There was a clear internal market dimension in this case, as the Court was also asked
whether the holder of a patent on a medicinal product issued in the Netherlands might prevent
the importation of similar products from another Member State where the medicinal product is
not patentable.
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the fact that the price comparison was between patented and unpatented
products.
Indeed, in Renault,26 the Court of Justice was asked by an Italian tribunal
whether it would be abusive for a car manufacturer to register intellectual
property rights in respect of an ornamental design of spare parts for cars and
hence to eliminate competition from independent manufacturers of spare
parts. The Court replied that the mere fact of securing the benefit of an exclu-
sive right granted by national law could not be condemned, but that the exer-
cise of such a right might be abusive if it led to an arbitrary refusal by the
dominant firm to deliver spare parts to independent repairers, excessive prices
for the spare parts, or a decision by the dominant firm not to produce spare
parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model remain in
circulation.27 Then the Court held that:
17. (. . .) a higher price for the [registered component sold by the car manufacturer]
than for the [unprotected component sold by independent producers] does not nec-
essarily constitute an abuse, since the proprietor of protective rights in respect of an
ornamental design may lawfully call for a return on the amounts which he has
invested in order to perfect the protected design.
Therefore, a comparison between the price of a product protected by an IPR
and the price of a similar unprotected product is not sufficient to prove that
the former is unfair because investment incentives in intellectual property
need to be safeguarded. As noted by Gyselen (1990: 605), the Court implicitly
accepted that an inventor must be given the opportunity to objectively justify
its higher price as a means to recoup its extra costs and prevent third parties
from taking a free ride on its efforts to innovate.
The second variant of the test (comparison with firms active in another 
geographic market situated in the same Member State) is illustrated in Figure
5, where the comparison is made between the price pM of the dominant firm
under investigation and the market price pB arising in another market B.
This second variant was explicitly endorsed by the Court in Bodson.28 In
this preliminary ruling decision on the legality of public exclusive concessions
to provide the external services for funerals, the Court stated in an obiter dic-
tum that:
31. (. . .) it must be possible to make a comparison between the prices charged by
the group of undertakings which hold a concession and prices charged elsewhere.
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26 Case 53/87 Renault 53/87 [1988] ECR 6039, paras. 16–17.
27 One may question whether there is a secondary market for spare parts for each car type. If
potential buyers of cars are able to take into account the cost of after-sales services, including
spare parts, such secondary market would not exist (Motta, 2004: chapter 3).
28 Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479. Note that this second variant had previously been
applied by the Commission in General Motors when it compared the charges of GMC with the
charges of the agents of other manufacturers. The Commission compared in this case the prices
of different monopolists, without any reference to a competitive price.
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Such a comparison could provide a basis for assessing whether or not the prices
charged by the concession holders are fair.
In this case, the Court rightly suggested comparing the price on a market
which is not competitive (the one covered by the public concession) with the
price of a competitive market (the one not covered by the public concession).
The third variant (comparison with firms active in another Member State,
sometimes called ‘benchmarking’), has been endorsed by the Court, and
indeed was often referred to in preliminary ruling cases as it carries with it an
internal market dimension.
In Deutsche Grammophon,29 the Court of Justice was asked by a German
Tribunal whether a German manufacturer of sound recordings would abuse
its exclusive right of distribution by imposing a selling price in Germany that
is higher than the price of the original product sold in France and re-imported
in Germany.30 The Court held that:
19. The difference between the controlled price (ie, in Germany) and the price of the
product reimported from another Member State (ie, France) does not necessarily
suffice to disclose an abuse; it may however, if unjustified by any objective criteria
and if it is particularly marked, be a determining factor in such abuse.31
In this case, and in contrast to Parke Davis, the sound recordings were pro-
tected by IPRs in both Member States, and the Court concluded that the
comparison of prices might be relied upon to show that the prices were unfair.
This third variant was confirmed and refined in SACEM II.32 The Court of
Justice was asked by a French court whether the rate of royalty charged by a
French musical copyright management society to French discotheques, which
was substantially higher than those applied by identical societies in other
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30 The Court was also asked whether a German undertaking manufacturing sound recordings
may rely on its exclusive right of distribution to prohibit the marketing in Germany of sound
recordings which it has itself supplied to its French subsidiary.
31 See similarly, albeit less clearly, Case 40/70 Sirena [1971] ECR 69, para. 17: “Although the
price level of the product may not of itself necessarily suffice to disclose such an abuse, it may,
however, if unjustified by any objective criteria, and if it is particularly high, be a determining
factor”.
32 Cited at note 14.
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Member States, was to be deemed excessive. In practice, SACEM was charg-
ing a fixed rate of 8.25% of the turnover of the discotheques, which was
revealed by a Commission study (cited in OECD, 1996: 129) to be more than
four times the European average. The Court replied that:
25. When an undertaking holding a dominant position imposes scales of fees for its
services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States
and where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a consistent basis, that
difference must be regarded as indicative of an abuse of a dominant position. In
such a case, it is for the undertaking in question to justify the difference by reference
to objective dissimilarities between the situation in the Member State concerned
and the situation prevailing in all the other Member States.
Thus, if there are substantial price differences between Member States, the
burden of proof shifts from the competition authority to the dominant firm
which has to show that its price is not excessive. It is interesting to note that,
in this case, the Court did not stipulate that the benchmarked market (ie, the
compared Member State) had to be competitive. Hence, an antitrust author-
ity may compare the prices of two markets, each of which is monopolised by
a different player. In practice, following the Court’s judgment, SACEM
reduced its royalty in 1991 from 8.25% to 7.18% of the discotheques’
turnover. Following an opinion by the French Conseil de la Concurrence,33
it further decreased the rate to 4.39% in 1993.
D. Recent practice of the European Commission
In more than forty years of competition practice, the Commission adopted
only four formal decisions condemning excessive prices. The first three cases
(General Motors in 1974, United Brands in 1975, and British Leyland in
1984) have been discussed above.
In the most recent case, Deutsche Post II34 of 2001, DPAG (which enjoyed
at the time a legal monopoly for internal mail) considered that any mail com-
ing from abroad but containing a reference to Germany—usually in the form
of a German reply address—had a German sender, regardless of where the
mail was produced or posted.35 DPAG considered that this mail circum-
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33 Conseil de la Concurrence, Opinion 93-A-05 of 20 April 1993.
34 Commission Decision of 25 July 2001, Deutsche Post II, OJ L 331 [2001], paras. 159–67. The
Court of Justice had previously decided that DPAG was allowed to charge internal tariffs for
truly circumvented domestic mail to safeguard general interest objectives. See Cases C-147 &
148/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-825, para. 61.
35 This sort of mail is becoming increasingly common for commercial mailing companies.
These companies centralise their mail distribution by sending mails from one distribution point
to addressees in a number of countries, but they provide the possibility for the addressees to reply
to an address in their own country to increase the response rate.
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vented domestic mail, and consequently applied the domestic tariff (ie,
€0.51).
First, the Commission investigated the identity of the sender of the 
disputed mails. It found that they did not have German senders but on the
contrary were posted from the UK. Hence, the mail did not circumvent
domestic mail and should be treated as normal international mail. Second,
the Commission determined that charging domestic tariffs to disputed pieces
of mail was above cost. The Commission could not make a detailed analysis
of DPAG’s average costs, as there were no reliable accounting data for the
relevant period,36 nor could the Commission compare DPAG’ prices with
those of competitors, as DPAG was a monopolist. Instead, the Commission
estimated the cost of delivering of incoming international mail on the basis of
DPAG’s own estimate. Indeed, in its notification of the REIMS II agree-
ment,37 DPAG had submitted that the cost related to distribution of 
international traffic was only 80% of the cost of processing domestic mail (as
there is no need to collect the mail all over the country). Thus, the
Commission estimated that the cost of the disputed pieces of mail was at least
20% lower than the charged tariffs. Accordingly, it imposed a fine, but only
of the symbolic amount of €1000 due to the legal uncertainty at the time.
Contrary to the previous Commission decisions on unfair prices, Deutsche
Post did not appeal because the main point of the case was more related to the
determination of the sender of the mails than to the level of the prices. Once
it was established that the disputed mail was not circumvented internal mail,
even DPAG did not really challenge that a lower tariff should have been
applied. 
The above mentioned four cases are only the visible tip of the iceberg. The
Commission initiated several other cases that did not lead to formal decisions
but nevertheless resulted in price decreases. Most of the cases related to the
recently liberalised network industries, such as airlines,38 electricity,39 and, in
particular, telecommunications.40
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36 Postal Directive 97/67/EC (OJ L 15 [1998]) imposes the introduction of a transparent inter-
nal cost accounting system, but this was not yet in place when the alleged abuse was committed.
37 Commission Decision of 15 September 1999, REIMS II, OJ L 275 [1999], para. 88;
Commission Decision of 23 October 2003, REIMS II Extension, OJ L 56 [2004].
38 In Sterling Airways, the Commission considered that the high fares on the Copenhagen-
London route of the then-legal monopolist airline SAS could be abusive due to very high
profitability (price above costs). However, the case was closed when the fares dropped consider-
ably in comparison to the other SAS international routes. See European Commission (1980: Xth
Report on Competition Policy, para. 137.
39 Electricity transmission tariffs in the Netherlands, in European Comission (1999): XXIXth
Report on Competition Policy, p. 165, where the Commission found that charges for electricity
transmission must always be linked to actual cost in order to avoid abuse within the meaning of
Article 82 EC.
40 Excessive prices in the telecoms sector are dealt with in the Commission Notice on the appli-
cation of competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, OJ C 265
[1998], paras. 105–9.
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With regard to the telephone calls on a fixed line, cases were opened in 
several Member States in 1998 against excessive prices for international calls,
and their related wholesale charges paid between foreign operators.41 The
Commission proved its cases using the discrimination method, and progres-
sively closed the cases when the prices decreased (by 26% to 28%), sometimes
due to the intervention of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs).
With regard to the calls on a mobile line, several cases were opened for
excessive prices for fixed-to-mobile calls, and their related wholesale
charges.42 In 1998, proceedings related to unfair fixed termination charges
(proved with discrimination and benchmarking), unfair fixed retention
charges (proved with benchmarking), and unfair mobile termination charges
(proved with discrimination and benchmarking).43 The cases were passed to
NRAs when they had jurisdiction to intervene under national telecommuni-
cation law, and otherwise were closed after the operators agreed substantial
reductions of their charges (from 30% to 80%). The issue of excessive mobile
termination charges arose again in 2002 in the Netherlands on the basis of a
complaint of WorldCom, but the Commission decided this time to treat the
case as a form of abusive price squeeze.44
In 1999, and again in the mobile sector, the Commission investigated the
high prevailing international roaming prices,45 relying on the very rarely used
‘sector inquiry’ provision, which allows the Commission to carry out an
investigation into a whole market rather than specific companies. No formal
case has been opened yet, but in an interim report, the Commission identified
several possibilities of excessive prices on the basis of discrimination, bench-
marking, and an analysis of the pattern of changes of the price over a four
years period. 
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41 IP/97/1180 of 19 December 1997; IP/98/763 of 13 August 1998; IP/99/279 of 29 April 1999.
These cases related to the so-called “accounting rates”, which are the charges agreed between the
telecom operator of the country where the call originates and the telecom operator of the coun-
try where the call terminates for carrying a call of a duration of one minute from its origin to its
destination. Each of the two companies involved receives a share—usually half—of this account-
ing rate.
42 IP/98/141 of 9 February 1998; IP/98/707 of 27 July 1998; IP/98/1036 of 26 November 1998;
IP/99/298 of 4 May 1998.
43 In the case of mobile-to-fixed calls, the fixed termination charge is the fee paid by the mobile
operator to the fixed operator for terminating the call. In case of fixed-to-mobile calls, the mobile
termination charge is the fee paid by the fixed operator to the mobile operator for terminating
the call, and the fixed retention charge is the fee kept by the fixed operator for originating the call. 
44 IP/02/483 of 27 March 2002. The case is still pending before the Commission.
45 IP/00/111 of 4 February 2000; Commission services Working Document on the initial
findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges, 13 December 2000, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/roaming/;
MEMO/01/262 of 11 July 2001. International roaming tariffs are the charges that a mobile cus-
tomer has to pay while giving and receiving calls abroad using a network other than the one to
which he is affiliated.
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With regard to leased lines, which are an important building block of the
Information Society, the Commission in 1999 launched another sector
inquiry46 into the conditions under which such leased lines are provided.
Relying on benchmarking, the Commission identified several possible
instances of excessive pricing of national and international leased lines and
decided to open five cases for unfair international leased line prices. The
inquiry, and most of the cases, were closed in December 2002 due to a
significant drop in prices (by 30% to 40% on average).
This brief overview shows that, although in law every dominant firm may
be liable for unfair prices, in practice the Commission has used this power
sparingly. As the Commission has itself noted, it does not want to behave as
a price regulator.47 It has initiated very few cases and has adopted even fewer
formal decisions.48 Most cases involved a dominant position protected in
varying degrees by government action and, in most instances, special circum-
stances applied (Gyselen, 1990: 613; Kauper, 1990: 659). Two streams of cases
may be distinguished. In the first, the dominant undertaking enjoyed a legal
monopoly (General Motors, British Leyland) and the abuse created serious
impediment to the internal market. The Commission was more concerned
with the freedom of circulation than with the anticompetitive exploitation of
end users and the associated allocative inefficiencies (Martinez, 1998: 2).
In the second stream of cases, the dominant undertaking was active on
markets recently opened to competition (Deutsche Post, telecommunications
cases) and any pricing abuse may have weakened the political momentum for
the liberalisation program. As noted by a senior Commission official
(Ungerer, 2001: 11), ‘the procedures aimed particularly at passing on rapidly
the advantages of liberalisation in terms of price reductions and service devel-
opments to consumers—a major objective in order to show as rapidly as pos-
sible the effective consumer benefits and to secure sustained public support
for liberalisation’. Moreover, the Commission relied as much as possible on
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46 IP/99/786 of 22 October 1999; Commission services Working Document on the initial
results of the leased lines sector inquiry, 8 September 2000, available at http://www.europa.
eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/leased_lines/; IP/00/1043 of 22
September 2000; IP/02/1852 of 11 December 2002.
47 European Commission (1975): Vth Report on Competition Policy, para. 76; European
Comission (1994): XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994), para. 207: “(. . .) the existence
of a dominant position is not in itself against the rules of competition. Consumers can suffer from
a dominant company exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices higher
than would be found if the market were subject to effective competition. The Commission in its
decision-making practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such.
Rather it examines the behaviour of the dominant company designed to preserve its dominance,
usually directly against competitors or new entrants who would normally bring about effective
competition and the price level associated with it” (emphasis supplied); European Comission
(1997): XXVIIth Commission Report on Competition Policy, para. 77.
48 Note also that most of the Court cases have been due to preliminary ruling questions rather
than to appeals against Commission Decisions.
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national regulators, limiting its intervention to situations in which sectoral
regulators either had no legal power to intervene (mobile termination rates,
roaming charges, or international leased lines tariffs) or were not intervening
appropriately (international accounting rates, fixed retention or termination
charges, national leased lines tariffs).
With regard to the means of proof, the Commission relied on different
comparative indicators, often using them cumulatively. In particular, it relied
extensively on the discrimination and the benchmarking methods.49 In addi-
tion, most of the interventions were based on prices 100% above the com-
parators (Hordijk, 2002:474), even though in some cases, it has relied on a
much smaller spread (Haag and Klotz, 1998: 38; Martinez, 1998: 8).
E. Policy recommendations
Arguments against antitrust control of excessive prices
The main arguments against applying competition law to instances of exces-
sive pricing cases in competition law are the following.50 First of all, it is use-
ful to recall the difference between sectoral regulation and competition law.
While the former pertains to markets where there are legal barriers to entry
and/or significant market failures, the latter generally applies to markets
where competitive forces are in principle free to operate. In such markets, the
general presumption should be that market forces will, over time, reduce the
market power of a dominant firm, or at least oblige the firm to reduce its
prices so that its customers will not switch to competitors. In other words,
exploitative practices are self-correcting because excessive prices will attract
new entrants. 
In such markets, the use of excessive price actions to increase consumer
welfare might help in the short run, but it is likely to have serious negative
effects of a longer duration. If firms anticipated that an antitrust authority
were ready to cap their prices when they are so successful as to become dom-
inant and enjoy high profits, then their incentive to invest and innovate would
be substantially diminished. The threat of excessive price actions that ‘expro-
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49 Benchmarking was also extensively used in the early phase of telecoms liberalisation.
Benchmarking was intended to ensure that the prices of incumbents fulfilled cost-orientation
obligations applying in the telecoms sector at a time when no cost-transparency accounting was
in place and when there was therefore significant information asymmetry between the regulator
and the operators.
50 See, among others, Areeda and Hovenkamp (1996: 720); Gyselen (1990: 600); Hordijk
(2002: 475); Korah (2000: 147); Whish (2003: 688).
(F) Ehlermann Motta  1/2/06  11:49  Page 108
priate’ from firms the fruit of their investments would diminish the expected
returns and thus discourage them from investing. Indeed, if the charging of
monopoly prices were prohibited, then in fact monopoly itself would be pro-
hibited, since a monopolist must be entitled to maximise profits. 
Things are made worse by the fact that establishing the ‘excessiveness of
prices’ is a very complex operation whose outcome is necessarily hard to pre-
dict. Indeed, in many situations even computing the relevant measures of
costs would be a complex exercise: How does one allocate common costs to
different products (long-run incremental costs, stand-alone costs)? How does
one choose between different accounting methods (historic costs, current
costs)? Which measure of costs should be adopted to measure profits in indus-
tries where there are important fixed costs? All these difficulties are under-
lined by the fact that a competition authority may not have as a deep a
knowledge of the sector being investigated as an industry regulator.
Furthermore, and unlike an industry regulator, a competition authority’s
role is not to set prices, whereas an excessive pricing action amounts de facto
to telling a firm that a price above a certain level would not be acceptable. On
top of that, the intervention occurs only at a given point in time, and leaves
open the issue of how prices should evolve over time. Unless a structural rem-
edy is imposed (a measure which might have other important drawbacks), the
antitrust authority would have to impose behavioural remedies, or continue
to monitor prices over time, therefore converting itself into a regulator of the
industry.
Antitrust control of excessive prices is justified only in specific cases of
dominant position
All the reasons listed above suggest that excessive pricing is a very dangerous
instrument to use in competition law. Yet there might be exceptional circum-
stances justifying the use of such a theory of liability. We believe in particular
that the following conditions must simultaneously arise to justify an action
against excessive pricing (as an exploitative abuse).
The first necessary (but not sufficient) condition is static and relies on the
presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry. In such a case, it is
extremely unlikely that market forces would be able to challenge the 
dominant firm and that the abusive practices would be self-correcting. In
practice, the investigated firm should enjoy a monopoly (or near monopoly),
or control an essential facility whose position may not be contestable.
This approach is consistent with some recent statements by NCAs. For
instance, the French Conseil de la Concurrence (2003: 67) intends to impose
cost-orientation only exceptionally, in particular where a dominant firm 
controls essential facilities. It also notes that it is not an appropriate tool to
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remedy a competitive problem, but should mainly be used to support a 
liberalisation process and to facilitate entry of new firms in the markets. The
British Office of Fair Trading (1999: 6) will only intervene if: (i) the price in
question is higher than would be expected in a competitive market; and (ii)
there is no effective market pressure to bring the price down to a competitive
level (and this is unlikely to change). Like its French counterpart, the OFT
notes that excessive pricing cases are particularly relevant where a dominant
undertaking exploits an essential facility.51
The second necessary condition is dynamic and limits intervention to
monopoly (or near monopoly) that is due to current or past exclusive or 
special rights.52 Considering that every incontestable monopoly may be con-
demned would be justifiable in a static setting looking at the market situation
ex post. However, in a more dynamic setting, taking into account the effect of
the intervention on investment incentives, this simplistic argument is no
longer valid because fear of antitrust intervention may undermine investment
incentives. There is thus a trade-off between static short-term considerations
(which would imply that only the first condition should be met for interven-
tion to take place) and dynamic long-term considerations (which would call
for additional conditions). Due to all the drawbacks of antitrust excessive
price actions, we suggest that the balance should tilt in favour of dynamic
consideration. Hence, interventions would only be justified if they have no
effect on investment incentives, or in other words, if the monopoly (or near
monopoly) in question was due to current or past legal protection.
Thus, if the dominant position has been attained in a market where entry
was unrestricted (through investments, innovation, or simply business luck),
then competition law should not intervene. More likely than not, firms had
anticipated that the winner would have enjoyed such a strong position and
heavy investments have probably been made to obtain it. High prices are
likely to be the reward for past investments.53 For instance, many network
markets are characterised by such a situation, where there is competition for
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51 In addition, the OFT (1999: 6) recognises three situations where a price that appears to be
above cost is not abusive: (1) high prices may occur for short period within a competitive mar-
ket; (2), high prices may reflect superior technology/products; and (3) prices may be high in mar-
kets with continuous innovation that should be rewarded.
52 Note that the above two conditions justifying antitrust control of excessive prices are close,
but not identical, to the conditions justifying sectoral regulation. According to the Commission,
telecoms regulation is justified mainly when there are high permanent entry barriers and when
behind the barriers, the structure of the market is not conducive to competition. However, these
two conditions for sectoral regulation are broader—and easier to meet by the authority—than
the ones we propose for exploitative abuse. Indeed, the sectoral conditions cover all cases of nat-
ural monopoly (however acquired), as well as cases of tight oligopoly leading to tacit collusion:
Recitals 9 to 16 of the Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product
and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regula-
tion, OJ L 114 [2003]. 
53 A particular example of this category would be a monopoly position obtained through
intellectual property rights protection, such as patents (of course, IPRs must be worth protect-
ing, but this is another matter . . .).
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the market rather than competition in the market. Conversely, if the 
dominant position has been obtained through past or current legal barriers,
intervention may be justified. In such a case, high prices are not the reward for
past efforts and investments, but simply a rent due to reasons not related to
market competition. 
Cases in point are most of the industries formerly dominated by public
monopolies in Europe. Telecommunications, energy and postal services are
all industries where the former incumbent monopolists enjoy dominant posi-
tions in the national markets, and where—due to a combination of network
effects, switching costs, exclusionary practices, and regulatory mistakes—
competition does not work properly despite the fact that, nominally, entry is
free.54
Interestingly enough, these two conditions are broadly consistent with the
Commission’s practice. Indeed, it has intervened mainly in cases of legal
monopoly not justified by investment (eg, General Motors, British Leyland,
SACEM), or in newly liberalised sector (like telecom industries). It is also the
view recently advocated by the Director General of DG Competition who
stated that: 
There can moreover be a legitimate interest to prosecute exploitative practices at
least where they are not self-correcting, namely where entry barriers are high or
even insuperable. In particular in newly liberalised sectors, entry barriers remain
high and above-competitive profits will therefore not automatically attract new
entrants. Moreover dominant firms in those sectors often obtained their position
not through superior efficiency, but through State intervention. (Lowe, 2003: 9) 
Moreover, two additional conditions related to the institutional issues may
have to be fulfilled for the antitrust action to be justified. First, there should
not be an effective means for the competition authority to eliminate the entry
barriers. Indeed, when the dominance is due to current legal barriers, it may
be more cost-effective for the authority to lobby the government to lift the
barriers and liberalise effectively the sector than to open several exploitative
abuse cases. As noted by Fingleton (2003), ‘Advocacy may be more effective
in that a decision by the State to liberalise a sector (and even better to imple-
ment liberalisation with enthusiasm) and pro-consumer focus may be a faster
remedy to develop competition than a long and expensive court case’ (see also
Amato and Laudati, 2001).
Second, there should be no sector-specific regulator. Indeed, a specific 
regulator usually has better knowledge of the sector, and usually has the right
to intervene with a lower burden of proof. Hence, the regulator should be able
to police exploitative abuses much more efficiently than an antitrust author-
ity would. However, the intervention may also be justified if the regulator is
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in which there is free entry in principle are not necessarily markets where competition works in
practice, with dominant positions persisting over time. 
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doing poorly and if the antitrust authority would correct the regulatory fail-
ure. This hypothesis is particularly relevant in the diagonal relationship
between the European antitrust authority (DG Competition) and the
national regulators. In practice, many cases opened by the Commission in the
telecoms sector were intended to correct a failure to act on the part of the
NRAs. Admittedly, this entails a value judgement on the performance of the
regulator and might lead to some institutional conflicts.
Proof of the abuse
Using economic theory we may now screen the Court’s cocktail of
approaches to proving that a price is excessive.
First, the antitrust authority may show that the price under review is above
the production costs of an efficient firm. However, contrary to the predatory
pricing cases,55 the Court did not go into much detail on the type of cost to be
taken into account (marginal cost, long term average cost, total cost, . . .).
This uncertainty is regrettable, particularly in oligopolistic or multi-services
industries with important common costs where the effective competitive price
does not equal the marginal cost and where the allocation of these common
costs raise difficult issues. Moreover, the Court did not clarify what level of
profit may be acceptable,56 that is, by which degree prices should be above
costs in order for them to be gauged excessive (in other words, in terms of
Figure 1, it is not clear at which level p* is).
Second, as production costs are not easily observable, particularly for
antitrust enforcers who face important asymmetric information, the author-
ity may compare different prices of the investigated firm and show some dis-
crimination (across customers in the same country or across countries).
Although this means of proof is relatively straightforward and has been used
extensively by the Commission, it raises difficult issues (Varian, 1989).
Indeed, it would be tantamount to prohibiting price discrimination across
markets (which might be different for reasons of demand, costs and market
structure), a prohibition that cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
Economic theory shows that price discrimination may be an efficient way to
recoup costs. Disallowing price discrimination might have adverse welfare
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55 Case 62/86 Akzo (1991( ECR I-3359, paras. 69–74; Case T-83/1991 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR
II-755, paras. 144–9; Cases C-359 & 396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge (2000( ECR I-1365. A
price is deemed to be predatory if it is below the dominant company’s average variable costs, or
if it is below average total costs and part of an anticompetitive plan. At least so far, the case law
has not imposed any requirement according to which it must be shown that the losses sustained
through the application of predatory prices will be recouped by the dominant firm. 
56 In Case 247/86 Alsatel/Novasam [1988] ECR 5987, para. 10, the Court of Justice provided
some limited and qualified guidance, stating that a price increase of more than 25% might be 
abusive.
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effects, for instance by discouraging investments and innovations, and by
pushing a firm not to serve some markets at all (Motta 2004: 7.4).
Third, the antitrust authority may also compare the investigated price with
the prices of other firms offering similar product. The first variant is to look
at the price of the competitors of the dominant firm. We are puzzled by a rule
considering that a dominant firm’s price above competitor prices would be
automatically unlawful. This higher price may cover lots of different situa-
tions, the majority of them being compatible with a competitive outcome.
First, it may indicate that the products are not in the same relevant market,
and that the market was thus wrongly defined (and the compared firms are
not competitors). Second, it may indicate that the products are part of the
same market, but the product of the dominant firm has a superior quality that
justified a premium price. Moreover, the very presence of competitors is a
strong (albeit not absolute) indication that entry is possible and that the dom-
inant firm’s position can be contested. In short, a mere comparison with 
competitors’ prices gives much too little indication to infer anticompetitive
behaviour on the part of the dominant firm. Such a comparison should be
supplemented by additional elements. 
The antitrust authority may also compare the investigated price with the
prices of other firms active on relevant markets other than that on which the
dominant undertaking operates (whether in the same or in another Member
State). Here as well, a simple rule should be avoided and two important 
elements should be kept in mind. Firstly, it is preferable to ensure that the
compared market is a competitive one, as the comparison between two
monopolised markets gives very little indication as to the level of the compet-
itive price. Secondly, price discrimination between markets may be justified
on efficiency grounds. Hence, a mere difference of price between markets
should not be deemed to constitute an exploitative abuse.
To conclude, the proof of an excessive price, or in other words the search
for the competitive price, may be like a quest for the Holy Grail. Even if the
authorities had perfect knowledge of costs, questions related to the allocation
of common cost would arise and involve difficult policy choices. Most of the
time, these authorities do not know these costs, and would guess competitive
price using other observable but imperfect price indications. However, eco-
nomic theory teaches us that a mere comparison of price should not suffice to
prove an abusive practice. The comparison should always be complemented
by a detailed assessment of market characteristics and a thorough economic
analysis of the rationale, if any, explaining the divergence in prices.
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F. Exclusionary Price
In the previous section, we dealt with the case where the dominant firm whose
pricing policy is under investigation sells its product or service to final con-
sumers or firms with which it does not compete (see Figure 6a). Now we are
considering a setting where the dominant firm is vertically integrated. Its
upstream affiliate produces an input that is used by its downstream affiliate
as well as downstream independent firms for the production of a final good.
Figure 6b illustrates this situation in the simple example where there is only
one downstream rival.
In this situation, if the dominant firm charges an excessive price for the input
sold to the downstream rival, the latter would suffer a competitive disadvan-
tage with respect to the dominant firm’s downstream affiliate, and might end
up being excluded from the market. This type of excessive pricing, which is
generally referred to as a price squeeze, amounts to an exclusionary abuse. It
is one of the many foreclosure strategies (like refusal to deal, tying, predatory
prices, . . .) that may be used by the investigated firm to create, maintain or
strengthen a dominant position on the downstream market.
1. Principles derived from the case law
Although the case law on foreclosure devices is fairly extensive (for an
overview, see Bellamy and Child, 2001: 724–56; Whish, 2003: 653–32), there
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is only one decision by the Court of First Instance on the particular strategy
of price squeeze.57 Moreover, this judgment only slightly touched on the issue
when upholding the Commission’s rejection of a complaint concerning verti-
cal price squeeze. A much more articulated decision is expected in the forth-
coming Deutsche Telekom case.58
1.1. Dominant position: which firms are subject to antitrust 
control?
As two markets (upstream and downstream) are involved, it should be deter-
mined whether, for antitrust intervention to be justified, the investigated firm
would have to be dominant on both markets or only on one of them. The doc-
trine seems to consider that a ‘double dominance’ is required (Faull and
Nikpay, 1999: 174; Bellamy and Child, 2001: 730). Nevertheless, in Poudres
sphériques the Court of First Instance held that: 
178. (. . .) Price squeezing may be said to take place when an undertaking which is
in a dominant position on the market for an unprocessed product and itself uses part
of its production for the manufacture of a more processed product while at the same
time selling off surplus unprocessed product on the market, sets the price at which
it sells the unprocessed product at such level that those who purchase it do not have
sufficient profit margin on the processing to remain competitive on the market for
the processed product (emphasis supplied).
Thus, the court did not require a dominant position on both markets, but
only on the upstream market. That makes sense because a price squeeze is a
strategy to leverage the upstream market power elsewhere (similarly, see
Crocioni and Veljanovski 2003: 39).
In addition, and as in the case of exploitative abuses, due to the general for-
mulation of Article 82 EC, every dominant firm—however its market power
has been acquired or maintained—has the ‘special responsibility’ not to apply
abusive exclusionary prices.
1.2. Abuse: what is a price squeeze?
As with every exclusionary practice, in the case of price squeeze a distinction
must be made between competitive and anticompetitive margin squeeze.
Indeed, Article 82 EC does not prevent a company (even a dominant one)
from competing on the merits, and a mere insufficient margin for a competi-
tor to enter should not always be considered abusive. Thus, only a margin
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58 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, OJ L 263 [2003].
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squeeze that excludes a competitor that is more efficient than the vertically
integrated firm would be anticompetitive and should be condemned. More
precisely, according to Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003: 30):
an anti-competitive price squeeze arises when a vertically integrated undertaking,
with market power in the provision of an ‘essential’ upstream input, prices it and/or
its downstream product service, in such way and for a sufficiently long period of
time to deny an equally or more efficient downstream rival a sufficient profit to
remain in the market. 
An anticompetitive margin squeeze may have several causes. It may be due to
an excessive price upstream (understood as above) that may or may not be
discriminatory.59 It may also be due to a downstream predatory price (in the
sense of the AKZO case law referred to above).60 Thus, in Poudres
sphériques, the Court of First Instance held that:
179. (. . .) In the absence of abusive prices being charged by the [dominant firm] for
the raw material or of predatory pricing for the derived product, the fact that [a new
entrant] cannot, seemingly because of its higher production costs, remain competi-
tive in the sale of the derived product cannot justify characterising [the dominant
firm’s] pricing policy as abusive.
However, we suggest that this apparently limiting statement was linked to the
facts of the case and does not imply that the Court of First Instance consid-
ered that price squeeze might not be an abuse independent from excessive or
predatory pricing. Indeed in Continental Can, the Court of Justice considered
that Article 82 covers all types of anticompetitive exclusionary practices.61
26. The (Article 82(is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to con-
sumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their
impact on an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in (Article
3(g)(of the Treaty. Abuse may therefore occur if an undertaking in a dominant posi-
tion strengthens such a position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached
substantially fetters competition, i.e., that only undertakings remain in the market
whose behaviour depends on the dominant one.
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59 Note however that every anticompetitive margin squeeze that is due to upstream, non-
discriminatory excessive prices will necessarily lead to a cross-subsidisation of the retail division
by the wholesale division of the vertically integrated undertaking. Indeed, due to the insufficient
margin, the retail division is making a loss that is compensated by the excessive profit in the
wholesale division.
60 Two sorts of predatory prices downstream may be distinguished. The downstream price
may be predatory independently of the level of the upstream price. In this case, the price does not
cover the wholesale and the retail costs. Alternatively, the downstream price may be predatory
only if the level of the upstream price (supposed to exceed costs) is taken into account. In this case,
the downstream price covers the wholesale and the retail costs, but does not cover the upstream
price (supposed to be excessive) and the retail costs. If the upstream price is regulated on a cost-
orientation basis (as it is often the case in regulated industries), only the first type of predatory
downstream price may arise (see Bouckaert and Verboven, 2003). 
61 Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215. Similarly, see Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche
[1979] ECR 461, para. 91.
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There are two reasons why a price squeeze may be anticompetitive even
though excessive or predatory prices may not be proven. First, the price
squeeze may be due in practice to excessive or predatory prices as defined by
the EU case law, but the authority may be unable to establish that the prices
are excessive or predatory due to a lack of data and may rely instead on the
proof of an exclusionary margin. In this case, the proof of a margin squeeze
is an indirect way to show other prohibited pricing practices. Second and
more importantly, the price squeeze and the elimination of efficient competi-
tors may happen without the presence of excessive or predatory pricing as
defined by the EU case law.62 In this case, it would be impossible for the
authority to show any excessive or predatory price and yet intervention would
be appropriate. For both reasons, authorities should be able to condemn
margin squeeze independently, but only under very strict conditions.
Similarly, Faull and Nikpay (1999: 174) argue that ‘even if neither the
upstream nor the downstream price is in itself abusive (ie, excessive or preda-
tory) the combination of the two (the squeeze) is contrary to Article 82’.
So far, there has been no case dealing with how price squeeze may be estab-
lished independently of other abusive practices. As we suggest below, any
standard of proof should: (1) consist of a rigorous comparison between the
appropriate upstream and downstream prices; and (2) be complemented by
an economic analysis of the possibilities and the incentives to foreclose entry.
2. Practice of the European Commission
In more than forty years of practice, the Commission has adopted only three
formal price squeeze decisions, using three different techniques to prove the
margin squeeze. 
In National Carbonising,63 NCB had a virtual monopoly (95% market
share) on the wholesale market for coal and, via its subsidiary NSF, a very
strong dominance (85% market share) on the retail market for domestic hard
coke. NCC, one of the downstream competitors, complained that due to sev-
eral increases of the wholesale price, the margin between coal and hard coke
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(in respect of which the upstream affiliate has a monopoly) is 10, that the cost of producing the
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below cost, as its total costs are 18, which is higher than the final price charged by the vertically
integrated firm. 
63 Commission Decision of 29 October 1975, National Carbonising, OJ L 35 [1976].
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had become insufficient to allow domestic coke producer to operate econom-
ically. In an administrative letter,64 the Commission services considered that
An enterprise in a dominant position may have the obligation to arrange its price
so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of derivatives a margin sufficient
to enable it to survive in the long term.
Thus, the Commission services considered that the squeeze might be
proved by calculating that the margin is insufficient to cover the costs of an
efficient new entrant on the retail market. Due to the facts of the case, the
Commission services held the preliminary view that no price squeeze had been
committed. However, as NCC was questioning this appraisal before the
Court65 and since there was a risk that NCC would go bankrupt during the
Court proceedings, the Commission ordered NCB to decrease the price
charged to NCC to allow it to break even during the likely duration of the
appeal. Subsequently, the appeal was withdrawn.
In British Sugar,66 BS held a dominant position on both the market for
industrial non-packaged sugar and the market for retail packaged sugar.
Moreover, due to the Common Agricultural Policy Sugar Regime, the UK
sugar market was not flexible and entry was substantially limited. Napier
Brown, one of the competitors just entering the retail market, complained
that BS was pursuing several strategies (refusal to supply, undercutting retail
prices, discrimination, loyalty rebates) to drive out Napier Brown from the
market. On the pricing policy, the Commission found that: 
66. A company which is dominant in the market for both a raw material and a cor-
responding derived product may not maintain a margin between both prices which
is insufficient to reflect that dominant company’s own costs of transformation with
the result that competition in the derived product is restricted.
Thus, the Commission proved the squeeze by calculating that the margin
was insufficient to cover the retail costs of the dominant firm. With regard to
the facts of the case and in particular the other obvious exclusionary practices
adopted by BS, the Commission considered that BS’s pricing policy was
predatory and imposed a fine of €3 million. 
In Deutsche Telekom,67 DTAG held a nearly monopoly position on the
wholesale market for fixed telephone local infrastructure, and a strong dom-
inant position on the retail market for local telephone lines (ie, access to ana-
logue lines, ISDN, ADSL). Moreover, this strong market power resulted
from previous monopoly rights. In the context of the telecommunications
regulation, the German NRA, the RegTP, controlled each wholesale price
individually and the retail tariffs with a price cap on a basket of services.
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64 Cited in the Commission decision referred to above.
65 Case 109/75 R National Carbonising Company/Commission (1975) ECR 1193 and (1977)
ECR 381.
66 Commission Decision of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown-British Sugar, OJ L 284 [1988].
67 Cited at note 58.
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However, the new entrants on the German telecommunications market were
unhappy with this regulation, and complained to the Commission that
DTAG was practising margin squeeze such that entry on the retail market
had been rendered uneconomic.
In its decision, the Commission held that:
107. (. . .) there is an abusive margin squeeze if the difference between the retail
prices charged by the dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its
competitors for comparable services is negative, or insufficient to cover the prod-
uct-specific costs to the dominant operator of providing its own retail services on
the downstream market (our italics).
As the wholesale access to the local loop might be used to provide several
types of retail access, the Commission compared the wholesale charge of 
the local loop access with the price of a basket composed of three retail 
services (namely analogue, ISDN and ADSL connections) weighted accord-
ing to the consumption pattern of DTAG’s customers for the different 
services. It found a negative margin for several years, and then an 
insufficient positive margin afterwards. Accordingly, it imposed a fine of
€12.6 million. 
This case was difficult for at least two reasons. Firstly, different types of
access to the local loop may be given at the wholesale level and different ser-
vices may be offered at the retail level. To address this problem, the
Commission chose to compare the price of one type of wholesale access with
the price of a weighted basket of retail services. Both choices are subject to crit-
icism, in particular the composition of the basket. Secondly, any condemna-
tion of DTAG’s tariffs was an indirect critique of the German regulator’
policy. To address this problem, the Commission carefully noted that within
the borders of the regulatory obligations (in particular the price cap basket),
DTAG enjoyed some discretionary power regarding the prices of each specific
service that would have enabled it to alleviate any price squeeze, either by
reducing the wholesale charges and/or by increasing the retail subscriber fees. 
Again, the three formal decisions discussed above represent only the tip of
the iceberg, as several other procedures were opened, particularly in the
telecommunications sector.68 In 1995, the Commission69 issued a Statement
of Objection against Belgacom regarding unfair prices related to access to
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See also Haag and Klotz (1998). More generally, for the price squeeze action in directory services,
see P. Richards (2003).
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subscribers’ data for the publication of telephone directories, which had the
effect of excluding competitors on the directory market. After a detailed cost
analysis, Belgacom settled the case with the Commission in 1997 and agreed
to substantially reduce its tariff (by more than 90% of the original price). In
1996, the Commission70 opened a procedure against Deutsche Telekom
regarding its new retail business tariffs on the ground that such tariffs dis-
criminated in favour of business customers vis-à-vis residential customers,
produced price squeezing effects in relation to competitors, and constituted
undue bundling of monopolised and competitive services.71 To close the file,
the Commission required the opening of the infrastructure market (thereby
enhancing the liberalisation process) and obliged the Federal Minister of Post
and Telecommunication (the telecoms regulator at that time) to ensure a fair
access price for the DTAG network. As a result, DTAG agreed to reduce sub-
stantially its access price (from 38% to 78%).72 As already mentioned, in 2002
the Commission opened a case against KPN for setting excessive mobile 
termination charges which, inter alia, gave rise to price squeezing effects.
However, no formal decision has yet been adopted.
From the foregoing it can be seen that most of the cases related to firms
enjoying a near monopoly position on the wholesale market and an already
strong dominance on the retail market. The foreclosure strategies were aimed
at reinforcing or maintaining this dominant position on the retail market. In
addition, and similarly to exploitative abuses, the cases mainly related to
newly liberalised sectors with the goal of ensuring the success of the liberali-
sation programme and condemning any strategic impediment to market
entry. With regard to the means of proof, the Commission considers that
price squeeze may be condemned as such, without having to show an exces-
sive or predatory price. Indeed, it has relied on three tests, depending on
whether the margin is: negative; positive but unprofitable for the dominant
vertically integrated firm; or positive but unprofitable for an efficient opera-
tor. Unfortunately, the assessment is often only complemented by an overly
superficial analysis of the possibilities and incentives for the dominant firm to
foreclose entry with a price squeeze.
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70 IP/96/543 of 25 July 1996; IP/96/975 of 31 October 1996; Haag and Klotz (1998: 37).
71 In particular, the Commission determined that the wholesale access price was excessive as
it exceeded the prices found on comparable competitive markets by more than 100%.
72 Moreover, in 1997, the Commission opened another case against Deutsche Telekom
regarding excessive prices for carrier pre-selection and number portability, which had the effects
of increasing end users’ switching costs, thereby rendering entry less attractive. The case was pur-
sued further by the German NRA, and the fees were reduced considerably by DT (by almost
50%). See IP/98/430 of 13 May 1998. 
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G. Policy recommendations
Economic Incentives to Foreclose
Although the logic of the argument according to which a vertically integrated
firm will set the input price so high as to disadvantage and even exclude down-
stream competitors might seem compelling at first sight, economics teaches us
that such a firm will not necessarily have an incentive to exclude rivals.
Indeed, the influential Chicago School argued that anticompetitive exclu-
sion was not rational, and that every exclusion would therefore be based on
efficiency grounds. The Chicago School economists argued that when a firm
enjoys substantial market power, there is only one monopoly rent to be
gained and that there is usually no need to use vertical integration and 
foreclosure strategies to reap this rent. This claim was based on a model in
which an upstream monopolist sells to perfectly competitive firms. In such
circumstances, the upstream monopolist is able to extract all the profits from
the market (since there is no problem of double marginalisation). Hence, a
vertically integrated firm would not gain anything from discriminating
against or excluding downstream rivals.
It is only recently that economists have rigorously shown that under certain
circumstances a vertically integrated firm does have an incentive to exclude
rivals, resulting in anticompetitive outcomes. A full account of the different
situations where foreclosure arises is beyond the scope of this paper, but such
situations include the use of different instruments. For instance, refusal to
supply (which is just the extreme case of an excessive price for an input, and
therefore equivalent to it) can allow a firm enjoying an upstream monopoly
to solve commitment problems that would otherwise erode its profits (Rey
and Tirole, 2003). Tying two goods together73 might in some circumstances
allow a firm to exclude rivals (Whinston, 1990), although one should expect
that this operation is more likely to be profitable when the goods are inde-
pendent than when they are vertically related, i.e., complementary. In net-
work industries, a dominant firm might have the incentive to make it difficult
for rival firms to interoperate with its own products74 (Katz and Shapiro,
1985).75
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and 7).
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More generally, recent economic models allow us to analyse situations
where there are several downstream and/or several upstream firms, and
enable us to show that in certain cases a vertically integrated firm might
create foreclosure (and that such foreclosure is welfare-detrimental).
These analyses show that the vertically integrated firm would seek to con-
tinue to supply the independent downstream firms in several instances. First,
ceasing to supply (or setting an excessive price of the input) downstream rivals
would not be profitable when the latter serve an at least partially different
market than the integrated downstream firm. Second, even if the upstream
integrated firm ceases to supply (or sells at higher prices to) the downstream
rival firms, the cost of the input for the latter will not increase if: (i) there are
other upstream firms which are ready to increase their supply of the input;
and (ii) the lower demand for the input (caused by the withdrawal from the
market of the downstream affiliate of the integrated firm) will tend to reduce
input prices. Therefore, foreclosure (in the sense of an increase in the prices of
the input available to independent firms) will occur only if there are no other
upstream producers that sell close enough substitute inputs (or if the capacity
of such upstream producers is constrained).
Therefore, it is appropriate to keep in mind that a number of conditions
must hold for a vertically integrated firm to engage in anticompetitive fore-
closure. In particular, theory suggests that one should expect this to arise only
in those cases where the vertically integrated firm enjoys a monopoly (or a
near monopoly) of an input for which there is no good substitute. 
Antitrust control of price squeeze is justified only in specific cases of
dominant position
Similarly to what we did for exploitative excessive prices, we may now pro-
pose some conditions for opening a price squeeze case. Although there is very
little economic literature on this topic (a welcome exception is Choné, 2002),
as price squeezing is one of the many different foreclosure strategies, the prin-
ciples developed above apply. 
Hence, the first condition is static and relies on the presence of high and
non-transitory barriers to entry. In other words, the investigated firm enjoys
a monopoly or quasi-monopoly at one stage of the production.
However, this condition may not be restrictive enough, as the same conflict
between static and dynamic objectives underlined above apply equally here.
Indeed, condemning a monopolist that tries to reap its rent through exclu-
sionary behaviour may have negative effects on investment incentives.
Condemning a firm for excessive pricing of inputs, and obliging it to reduce
that price, is similar in its effects to obliging the owner of infrastructure to
grant rivals access to it. Both types of actions impinge upon the property
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rights of the owner of the asset, and likely to trigger a fall in its profits. In turn,
and to the extent that the monopoly over the input is the fruit of investments,
this reduces the remuneration from the investments made in the past, and has
the additional effect of discouraging further investments by this and other
firms (as other firms will observe the action taken against the input monopo-
list and will expect similar actions in case it too has monopoly over an input
which turns out to be ‘essential’).
Should we then conclude that a second condition related to the way
monopoly has been acquired should be added, and that price squeeze action
should be limited to cases where monopoly is due to current or past legal
entry barriers? Although in general the numerous drawbacks of antitrust
actions against exploitative prices clearly tilt the balance in favour of very
strict conditions to intervene, this is relatively less the case for exclusionary
prices. Thus, we would advise the authority to take into account the effects of
its intervention on investment incentives, but would not go as far as requiring
that monopoly resulted from current or previous legal monopoly to justify
intervention. In other words, if the monopoly was not the result of investment
in a (ex ante) competitive market, but rather the inheritance from the past of
a legal monopoly, then the case for an excessive pricing action (or compulsory
access or licensing) would be much stronger, as this would not be a situation
where the antitrust authorities would deprive the firm of the fruit of its invest-
ments. Finally, the two additional institutional conditions related to the
efficient means for the antitrust authority to remove the legal entry barriers
and the presence of an efficient sectoral regulator would equally apply.
3. Proof of the price squeeze
To prove a price squeeze, an antitrust authority may show that the upstream
price is excessive, or that the downstream price is predatory, as understood
above.
The authority may also show that there is an insufficient margin between
wholesale and retail prices to cover the retail costs of a firm that is at least as
efficient as the dominant firm. This comparison may be complex, in particu-
lar in multi-services industries where fixed costs have to be allocated to dif-
ferent services and where a dominant firm may benefit from important
economies of scope (Crocioni and Veljanovski, 2003; Grout, 2001). As a 
general rule, the antitrust authority should avoid a test which is too lax and
which would favour entry of a less efficient firm than the dominant one. In
addition, the margin calculation should always be complemented by a rigor-
ous analysis of the ability and incentive of the dominant firm to foreclose
entry with a price squeezing strategy. This additional economic analysis is
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indispensable, as it is always very difficult to distinguish between competitive
and anticompetitive margin squeeze, and since there is therefore a high risk of
false condemnation (type I errors). Thus, the authority should show why the
monopolist has to reap or protect its monopoly rent by excluding its rivals. 
Without such a strict burden of proof, we may end up with multiple,
unjustified price squeeze actions, as was the case in the US electricity sector in
the Seventies. As noted by Joskow (1985: 174), ‘the great quantity of 
litigation motivated by concern about price squeezes in particular, and retail
market competition in general, has had no positive efficiency consequences; it
is at best a waste of time and litigation expense and at worst a source of
inefficiency’.
H. Conclusion
Fifteen years ago, Fox (1986: 992) noted that, ‘the Common Market law on
excessive pricing has profound implications. It assumes that high pricing is
unfair, it assumes that unfairly high pricing can be identified by courts, and it
implies that courts are better mechanisms than markets to correct unfairly
high pricing’. Indeed, the EC Treaty gives competition authorities very broad
powers to intervene against excessive prices (whether exploitative or 
exclusionary), that may embody a form of price regulation that the authors
of the Treaty may not have excluded at the time. However, this regulatory
conception is not in line with the insights of current legal and economic think-
ing. It is nowadays generally accepted that antitrust authorities should not
aim to directly regulate firms’ prices, access and output, but instead should
focus on preserving structures and conditions whereby market forces 
constrain price and increase output (see Hawk, 1988: 81). Obviously, the
Commission and the Courts can not change the Treaty, and the types of 
practices that are expressly mentioned therein must at least in certain circum-
stances be regarded as abusive. Therefore, we suggest that the Commission
uses its power with great restraint and that the Courts set a high standard of
proof.
With regard to exploitative excessive prices, we suggest that the
Commission should only intervene in cases of very strong dominance
(confined to a monopoly or near monopoly) that are caused by past or cur-
rent legal entry barriers, whenever market forces alone are unlikely to lead to
a competitive result. With regard to exclusionary excessive prices (in particu-
lar, price squeeze), we suggest that the Commission should intervene only in
cases of very strong dominance (confined to a monopoly or near monopoly),
and that it should focus (but not necessarily limit) its activities on monopolies
that are due to past or current legal entry barriers. Moreover, the means of
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proof should be elaborated and predicated on a thorough analysis of the 
market characteristics and the economic incentives of the undertakings.
Thus, excessive price actions should mainly be concentrated on mono-
polised sectors, or recently liberalised ones (such as telecoms, post, railways,
. . .). In other words, competition law applied to some sectors may be differ-
ent (and more interventionist) than in others (see Larouche, 2000). Similarly,
Hancher and Buendia Sierra (1998: 943) have proposed a less strict test—
more easily met by the authority—for predatory prices in some sectors and
noted that ‘competition rules cannot be applied in newly liberalised markets
in exactly the same way as they have been applied in “normal” sectors because
the market structures and the risks for competition are substantially differ-
ent’. At a more general level, we suggest that the mere dominance concept as
interpreted by the Court in United Brands is too generic to lead to appropri-
ate public policy towards firms with market power. In fact, intervention
against specific behaviour should depend on the level and the cause of market
power, or in other words, dominance should be differentiated according to
the abuse to be condemned.76
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